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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many reasons why Congress should not adopt new laws
mandating so-called net neutrality for broadband Internet service
providers ("ISPs"). One often overlooked and underappreciated reason
is that net neutrality requirements may violate the First Amendment
free speech rights of ISPs such as AT&T and Comcast Corporation. In
this instance, greater sensitivity to constitutional values, if not outright
constitutional dictates, will lead to sounder communications policy
than if such values are ignored.
The United States Senate and House of Representatives have
recently reviewed several net neutrality proposals. All of the
proposals share a common feature: in one way or another they restrict,
or allow the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to restrict
broadband ISPs from taking any action to "block, impair or degrade"
consumers from accessing any website, or from "discriminating"
against any unaffiliated entity's content. For example, one of the most
fulsome of these proposals is a bill drafted by Democratic Senator
Olympia Snowe of Maine and Republican Senator Byron Dorgan of
North Dakota. Felicitously called the "Internet Freedom Preservation
Act," the bill states that ISPs shall not "block, interfere with,
discriminate against, impair, or degrade the ability of any person to use
a broadband service to access, use, send, post, receive, or offer any
lawful content ... made available via the Internet."
'1
Furthermore, one version of another bill, drafted in 2006 by the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
contains similar language. The bill provides that every ISP shall allow
each subscriber to "access and post any lawful content of that
subscriber's choosing." 2 To put a finer point on the matter, the bill
further states that "no Internet service provider engaged in interstate
commerce may limit, restrict, ban, prohibit, or otherwise regulate
content on the Internet because of the religious views, political views,
or any other views expressed in such content unless specifically
1 Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 2917, 109th Cong. § 12(a)(1) (2006) (introduced in
Senate May 19, 2006). The identical bill was introduced by Senators Snowe and Dorgan in the
1 10 th Congress. See Internet Freedom Preservation Act, S. 215, 1 10 th Cong. (2007)
(introduced in Senate January 9, 2007).
2 Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th
Cong. § 903(a)(1) (as reported in Senate, June 12, 2006).
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authorized by law."3 A bill passed by the House of Representatives in
2006 contains a provision authorizing the FCC to enforce the agency's
net neutrality principles, one of which states that "consumers are
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
'A
II. THE POLICY BACKDROP: AN INCREASINGLY COMPETITIVE
BROADBAND ISP MARKETPLACE
Except for a few isolated and quickly remedied incidents,5 neither
the cable operators nor the telephone companies providing broadband
Internet services have yet blocked, impaired, or otherwise restricted
subscriber access to Internet applications or the content of unaffiliated
entities. This should not be surprising given that the broadband
Internet access market is rapidly becoming more competitive and
many consumers have the choice to change ISPs if displeased with
their provider's restrictions. 6
There are many early FCC statements on the competitiveness of
the broadband ISP marketplace and the build-out of alternative
infrastructures. The Agency most recently commented on the subject
in July 2006 when it approved the applications for consent to the
3 Id. § 904(2).
4 H.R. 5252, "Consumer Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006," as passed
House, June 8, 2006, granting the FCC authority to enforce neutrality principles promulgated
in a Policy Statement (FCC 05-15 1; CC Docket No. 02-33) released on September 23, 2005.
5 See, e.g., In re Madison River Comm., 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (Mar. 3, 2005) (consent decree
under which the Madison River Telephone Company agreed to cease blocking ports used by
Voice over Internet Protocol applications that competed with Madison River's traditional local
telephone service offerings).
6 See FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31,2005
(2006), Table 17, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
266596A1 .pdf. In the most recent of its regular reports tracking penetration of high-speed
broadband services, the FCC found that as of December 31, 2005, on a nationwide basis at
least 94% of the country's zip codes had two or more broadband providers available. Indeed,
approximately 83% of the nation's zip codes had three or more broadband competitors
available. This does not mean the competition was available ubiquitously throughout the zip
code, but it is a good indication of the extent to which competition is proliferating. The
figures are approximate because of rounding errors.
7 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
67 Fed. Reg. 9232, 4 (Feb. 14, 2002) ("As we have noted in the past, broadband is evolving
across multiple electronic platforms as traditional wireless, cable, satellite and wireline
providers have expended substantial investments in broadband capable infrastructures").
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transfer of control of the Adelphia cable system licenses to Comcast'
Corporation and Time Warner Cable, Incorporated.8  Rejecting
contentions that the proposed transactions would increase incentives
for Comcast or Time Warner to engage in conduct harmful to either
consumers or competition with respect to the delivery of Internet
content, services, or applications, the FCC majority concluded that
"competition among providers of broadband service is vigorous." 9
The FCC determined that broadband penetration was increasing
"rapidly," through "more vigorous competition."' 10 Moreover, the FCC
attributed the increase in the number of consumers with a choice of
multiple broadband providers and the increasing number of subscribers
to new broadband technologies such as cellular, WiFi, WiMax, and
now Broadband over Powerline ("BPL"). 11 According to the FCC's
most recent data, the percentage of zip codes served by four or more
different broadband ISPs increased from 43.7% in 2003 to 59.7% in
2005.12
8 See Applications for Consent to Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, 21
F.C.C.R. 8203, (July 21, 2006) [hereinafter Adelphia Order].
9 Id. at 8296.
1O Id.
" Id. at 8297.
12 Id. at 8297. Two commissioners dissented in the Adelphia Order, at least in part on the basis
that they do not view the broadband market as vigorously competitive as the Commission
majority. Both Commissioners Copps and Adelstein pointed out that cable operators and
telephone companies currently have approximately 98% of the broadband subscribers. They
apparently believe that the present largely duopolistic marketplace, even with cable and
telephone companies competing vigorously against each other in many markets, does not
constitute effective competition. And, they apparently discount the vigor of the potential
competition from wireless, satellite, and power companies to which the Commission majority
refers. See id. (Copps, Commissioner dissenting at 8366 and Adelstein, Commissioner
approving in part and dissenting in part at 8370). My own view is close to the Commission's
Adelphia Order majority, in no small part due to the technological dynamism that
characterizes the marketplace. Moreover, a close reading of the dissenting statements
indicates, at least regarding net neutrality regulation, no amount of broadband competitiveness
may alter their views. Thus, for example, Commissioner Copps states that: "Combining
content and conduit is, after all, the classic strategy for monopoly and control by a privileged
few." Id. at 8366. But there is a widely shared view among scholars that consumer welfare is
often (but not always) enhanced by efficiencies realized from integration of content and
applications on the one hand, and conduit on the other, even in situations in which there is a
platform monopolist (not generally the situation in the broadband market, as Commissioners
Copps and Aldelstein admit). See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in
the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 97-104 (2003).
[Vol. 3:1
The FCC majority in the Adelphia Order characterized broadband
competition as "vigorous." 13 Thus, it is unlikely that ISPs like Verizon
and Comcast, or broadband providers using other technological
platforms such as wireless or satellite,'4 or emerging powerline
systems, 15 will take any action that results in significant consumer
objection or resistance. If the providers do take such actions,
consumers simply will switch providers. As a matter of policy,
Congress should be very hesitant to enact net neutrality mandates in
anticipation of conjectured harms that may never materialize. 16 This is
especially so in the technologically dynamic areas of communications
and the Internet. As broadband network technologies and
infrastructures and Internet business models continue to evolve, laws
with open-ended and vague terms, such as "interfere with," "impair,"
and "degrade," almost certainly will turn out to be unduly
overreaching as applied to new, real-world applications and content.
This regulatory overextension inevitably would restrict or inhibit
ISPs from entering into economically efficient business arrangements
with applications or content providers, or from integrating their own
applications and services in the most economically efficient manner.
But for the net neutrality restrictions, these arrangements presumably
would allow the ISPs to provide higher quality, lower cost services in
forms preferred by consumers. Moreover, apart from practices that the
ISPs would assume undoubtedly to fall within the prohibitory
language, the inherent vagueness of the net neutrality restrictions
would provide grist for the litigation mills for years to come. This too,
would chill the development of new, more efficient, products and
services that otherwise would be available to consumers.
13 Adelphia Order, supra note 8, at 8296.
14 Id. at 8297 (stating "[piress reports indicate that both DBS providers have signed
distribution agreements with WildBlue Communications, Inc., a provider of satellite-based
Internet service").
15 See Caroline McCarthy, Study: Promising Future for Power-Line Broadband, CNET
NEWS.COM, Sept. 11, 2006, http://news.com.com/Study+Promising+future+for+power-
line+broadband/2100-1034_3-6114397.html ("The demand for using traditional electrical
lines as a medium for broadband technology in the residential sector is rising worldwide and
will continue to grow, according to a study by market research firm In-Stat.").
16 Even in 1996 Congress embraced this presumptive deregulatory principle with respect to
Internet services when it declared: "It is the policy of the United States... to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation." Telecommunications Act of
1996,47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (1998) (emphasis added).
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III. NET NEUTRALITY: NEUTERING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Even if net neutrality mandates made good policy sense, there is
another, more fundamental reason why they should not be adopted.
Because neutrality mandates invariably require ISPs to send or post
content which the ISPs might prefer not to send or post, they are, in
effect, speech restrictions that infringe the ISPs' constitutional rights.
The First Amendment's language is plain: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.0 7  Like newspapers,
magazines, cable operators, movie and music producers, and even the
man or woman preaching on a soapbox, ISPs such as Comcast and
Verizon possess free speech rights. They are all "speakers" for First
Amendment purposes, regardless of the medium or technology used to
convey their speech. While the medium may impact the degree of
First Amendment protection accorded--calling forth, at least at present,
a more or less strict standard of review18--broadband ISPs nevertheless
possess First Amendment rights as entities entitled to use their
facilities to convey messages of their own choosing. 19
Significantly, under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, it
is just as much a free speech infringement to compel a speaker to
convey messages the speaker does not wish to convey as it is to
prevent the speaker from conveying messages the speaker wishes to
convey. As the United States Supreme Court proclaimed in Pacific
Gas & Electric: "[c]ompelled access.. .both penalizes the expression of
particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18 The Supreme Court, for example, has afforded broadcasters a lesser degree of protection
than cable television operators and cable operators a lesser degree of protection than
newspaper publishers. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcast
model) with Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (cable model) with Miami
Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (print model). See generally Christopher
S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technologically-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L. J. 245 (2003) (describing and critiquing the different models and
standards of review employed by the Supreme Court in evaluating claims of First Amendment
violations relating to different media using various technologies) [hereinafter, Yoo The Rise
and Demise]. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (the Court stated: "We
have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment
problems").
19 Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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conform with an agenda they do not set.",20 The Court explained that
the "essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas. . . .There is
necessarily ...a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one
which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its
affirmative aspect."
21
In perhaps the most notable compelled access case, Miami Herald
Publishing Company v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that a Florida statute requiring a newspaper that published an editorial
critical of a political candidate to print the candidate's reply violated
the First Amendment. 22 In doing so, the Court acknowledged, but
rejected, Tornillo's argument that the Florida mandatory access statute
does not amount to a restriction of the newspaper's right to say
whatever it pleases:
Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not amount
to a restriction of appellant's right to speak because "the
statute in question here has not prevented the Miami Herald
from saying anything it wished" begs the core question.
Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which
"'reason' tells them should not be published" is what is at
issue in this case. The Florida statute operates as a command
in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding
appellant to publish specified matter. Governmental restraint
on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional
patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on
23governmental powers.
Neutrality laws, such as those currently proposed 24 that require an
ISP to "post," or "send," or allow "access" to any content of the
2 0 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (electric utility could not
be compelled, consistent with the First Amendment, to include a consumer group's views with
which it disagreed in its billing envelope).
21 Id. at 11 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985),
quoting in turn Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)
(emphasis in original)).
22 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
23 Id. at 256.
24 See supra notes 1, 2, and accompanying text.
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subscriber's choosing, are, for all practical purposes, compelled access
mandates akin to the Florida right to access statute at issue in Tornillo.
Even though these mandates do not literally "restrict" an ISP from
publishing content of its own choosing, they would compel the ISP to
convey or make available content that, in its editorial judgment, it
would otherwise choose not to convey or make available.
Net neutrality advocates sometimes suggest that today's major
broadband ISPs choose to be mere conduits, so that compelled
neutrality would not eliminate any editorial function that the ISPs are
now performing. ISPs like Verizon and Comcast do not function
solely as conduits for access to other Internet sites. Rather, as their
subscribers know, they exercise editorial discretion in programming
the ever-changing content of their home and other specialty pages.
When a subscriber logs on to Comcast's broadband service, for
example, the subscriber, absent choosing another home page, is
presented with a broad array of ISP-selected news, financial,
entertainment, sports, and other content. Thus, it is inaccurate to
suggest that ISPs are not presently functioning as "speakers" in the
sense of those traditionally within the ambit of First Amendment
protection.
Even in the digital age, computer storage capacity, data processing
capabilities, and transmission capacity are not unlimited or costless
resources. To the extent an ISP is required to carry more content and
applications than it otherwise might choose if it could exercise its
editorial discretion, there will likely be a financial impact on the ISP.
Specifically, costs will rise due to the increased storage, processing,
and transmission capacities necessary to meet new carriage
requirements. Contrary to the apparent belief of some net neutrality
proponents, ISP network resources are not "free" goods. By requiring
an ISP to carry content it would prefer not to carry, net neutrality laws
impose costs that may force the ISP to forego carrying other content it
would prefer to make available.
Relying expressly on Tornillo, a federal court in Florida held that a
county ordinance requiring a cable operator to allow competitors to
access its cable system on terms at least as favorable as those on which
it provides such access to itself was unconstitutional.25 The court
declared: "[u]nder the First Amendment, government should not
interfere with the process by which preferences for information evolve.
Not only the message, but also the messenger receives constitutional
25 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
[Vol. 3:1
protection." 26  In language directly pertinent to the current net
neutrality debate, the court proclaimed: "[c]ompelled access like that
ordered by the Broward County ordinance both penalizes expression
and forces the cable operators to alter their content to conform to an
agenda they do not set.",
27
In Tornillo, Chief Justice Burger painstakingly noted the claims
made by proponents of the compelled access statute that newspapers,
by virtue of the frequent lack of competing local papers and the cross-
ownership of local newspapers and broadcast stations, had come to
exercise monopolistic control over the dissemination of information in
their communities. He characterized the proffered "concentration of
control" justification for compelled access in the following manner:
The result of these vast changes has been to place in a few
hands the power to inform the American people and shape
public opinion. Much of the editorial opinion and
commentary that is printed is that of syndicated columnists
distributed nationwide and, as a result, we are told, on
national and world issues there tends to be a homogeneity of
editorial opinion, commentary, and interpretive analysis. The
abuses of bias and manipulative reportage are, likewise, said
to be the result of the vast accumulations of unreviewable
power in the modem media empires. In effect, it is claimed,
the public has lost any ability to respond or to contribute in a
meaningful way to the debate on issues.28
The Court described the argument as "[tihe First Amendment interest
of the public in being informed is said to be in peril because 'the
marketplace of ideas' is today a monopoly controlled by the owners of
the market."29
This "monopoly" argument did not sway the Court. For purposes
of First Amendment protection, the Court said:
However much validity may be found in these
[concentration of control] arguments, at each point the
26 Id. at 693.
271d. at 694.
28 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250.
291d. at 251.
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implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of
access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either
governmental or consensual. If it is governmental coercion,
this at once brings about a confrontation with the express
provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on
that Amendment developed over the years.30
Although the Tornillo Court emphasized that the result would have
been the same even if the mandated right to reply was costless to the
newspaper, it nevertheless pointed out that the Florida statute
necessarily imposed penalties and burdens on the newspaper required
to print a reply: "[t]he first phase of the penalty resulting from the
compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing
and composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be
devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to
print."3' Compelled access requirements that are central to all of the
net neutrality proposals have this very same effect, and thus suffer the
same defect. In effect, the costs of adding data processing and
transmission capacity to accommodate a "carry-all indiscriminately"
mandate is no different from the increase in printing cost and
composing time exacted by the right of reply statute at issue in
Tornillo.
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in the Broward County
case the Court observed that the equal access provision "distorts and
disrupts the integrity of the information market by interfering with the
ability of market participants to use different cost structures and
economic approaches based on the inherent advantages and
disadvantages of their respective technology." 32  Only in a world
where network components and resources were costless would this not
be so. In a world where real costs are associated with such components
and resources, compelled access forces the ISP to make editorial
decisions about the carrying of other content that the ISP otherwise
would not have to make.
In its most stark, and albeit, least probable form, a mandate-all
the net neutrality proposals contain them-that prevents an ISP from
"blocking" access by its subscribers to any lawful website would mean
that the ISP could not choose to restrict access to material that in its
30 d. at 254.
"' Id. at 256.
32 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
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view, say, is "indecent" or "homophobic" or, say, "unpatriotic" simply
because it did not wish to carry such content. Indeed, recall the
provision in the draft version of the Senate Commerce Committee bill
stating that "no Internet service provider engaged in interstate
commerce may limit, restrict, ban, prohibit, or otherwise regulate
content on the Internet because of religious views, political views, or
any other views expressed in such content unless specifically
authorized by law."34  The intent to restrict the ISP's freedom to
exercise its editorial judgment based on content considerations could
not be articulated more clearly.
Freedom of speech under the First Amendment is not absolute. As
observed above, 5 different media are sometimes treated differently.
For example, in 1994 in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,36 the
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, rejected the argument that a
law requiring cable operators to carry the signals of local broadcast
stations could never pass muster under the First Amendment. 37  The
Court readily acknowledged that such a carriage mandate implicated
the cable operators' First Amendment rights, declaring, "[a]t the heart
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should
decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence."
38
Nevertheless, relying heavily on Congress' judgment that local
stations providing "free" over-the-air television deserved special
economic protection, the Turner Court refused to invalidate the "must
carry" law outright without further fact-finding on remand concerning
33 Please understand that I am not suggesting that an ISP should adopt practices restricting
access to any lawful content. And I am certainly not suggesting that such a restriction would
be a successful business strategy. The examples simply illustrate the free speech interests at
stake.
34 See H.R. 5252, supra note 4.
35 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
36 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
31 Id. at 664-68.
38 Id. at 641. See also Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL.
L. REv. 699, 714 (2005) (as Christopher Yoo puts it, in addition to affirmative prohibitions on
speech, "liberty-oriented theorists would find interference with individual speakers' editorial
discretion to be a First Amendment harm, even in the absence of evidence that particular
content was favored or disfavored. Access requirements are particularly problematic in this
regard.").
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the law's actual effect and effectiveness. 39 Significantly, net neutrality
mandates are not claimed to be related to Turner's principal concern:
economic protection of local broadcast stations. Additionally, the
Turner Court assumed that cable operators possessed a bottleneck that
allowed them to play a "gatekeeper" role by controlling the
programming that entered subscribers' homes. In today's more
competitive environment, it cannot be contended that cable operators
have "bottleneck" control of the video content that enters consumers'
homes, assuming, for the sake of argument that they ever did.
The proposed neutrality mandates are, in some ways, eerily
reminiscent of the FCC's Fairness Doctrine, which the agency
jettisoned two decades ago in light the doctrine's chilling effect on
speech and the proliferation, even then, of new media outlets.4 0 The
Fairness Doctrine required that broadcasters present adequate,
balanced coverage of pubic issues.4 1 The strictest form of proposed
net neutrality mandates requires carriage of all Internet content on a
nondiscriminatory basis, not merely a balanced presentation.
Nevertheless, the dictate not to discriminate on the basis of content
certainly contains Fairness Doctrine echoes. In 1969 when the
Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, upheld the
Fairness Doctrine's form of compelled access regulation against First
Amendment challenge, it did so on the basis that broadcasters have
less First Amendment protection than other speakers because they use
the radio sp ectrum, which the court characterized as a "scarce public
resource. ' 42 Apart from whether the Court today would reach the
same result regarding broadcasters' free speech rights, 43 it has refused
39 512 U.S. at 666-68.
40 In re Inquiry Into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 169,
188-190, 224 (1985).
41 For a description of the doctrine, its impact on broadcasters, and a history of its demise, see
In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), affd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C.Cir. 1989). See also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(the FCC's commissioners' constitutional oath required them to consider the claim that the
Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional).
42 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 388 ("[B]ecause the frequencies reserved for public
broadcasting were limited in number, it was essential for the Government to tell some
applicants that they could not broadcast at all because there was room for only a few.").
43 There has been considerable criticism of the "scarcity doctrine" for many decades, even
before the Supreme Court employed the rationale in RedLion. The most famous and
persuasive early critique was that offered by Ronald Coase. R. H. Coase, The Federal
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to extend such scarcity-based reasoning to other media.44 It seems
unwise to import Fairness Doctrine-type speech restrictions, based
upon notions of scarcity of the broadcast spectrum, into the newly-
competitive environment of broadband ISPs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In effect, the current crop of net-neutrality proposals seeks to
reverse the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass 'n. v. Brand X Internet Services. 45 Brand X
affirmed the FCC determination that broadband ISPs are not regulated
common carriers subject to the requirement to carry all messages
indifferently and to grant compelled access to all comers.4 6  Net
neutrality mandates, by prohibiting all "discrimination" against
applications and content providers, would re-impose common carrier
obligations on the broadband ISPs.1
7
It may well be, as a matter of law, that Congress or the FCC has
the authority, consistent with the Constitution, to re-impose common
carrier or common carrier-like nondiscrimination obligations or rate
regulations on the broadband ISPs. In today's increasingly competitive
communications marketplace, however, this question is not entirely
Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1959). For an excellent comprehensive
discussion critiquing the "scarcity doctrine," including references to much of the academic
work critiquing the doctrine and also to court decisions subsequent to Red Lion that have
considered the doctrine's continuing vitality, see Yoo, The Rise and Demise, supra note 18, at
266-92.
44 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 637 ("But the rationale for applying a less rigorous
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the
cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation."); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 868 (1997) ("Thus, some of our cases have recognized special justifications for
regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers ... Those factors
are not present in cyberspace.").
45 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Interet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
46 id.
47 Nondiscrimination is one of the core obligations of common carriers. See 47 U.S.C. §
202(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable
discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in
connection with like communication service. "); see also Maislin Indust., U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-131 (1990); American Trucking Ass'n. v. FCC, 377
F.2d 121, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
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free from doubt.48 If broadband ISPs affirmatively were designated 
common carriers, assuming for the sake of argument that such 
designation is not an infringement of their property rights under the 
Fifth Amendment, then their free speech rights probably would not be 
implicated by net neutrality proposals. Post-Brand X, this has not 
happened. 
The critical focus of this essay is on the unappreciated but 
nevertheless fundamental First Amendment interests that are at stake 
in the raging net-neutrality debate. In this age of media abundance or, 
some might even say media overabundance--an environment that was 
almost unimaginable even a couple of decades ago--it is baffling that 
the imposition of Fairness Doctrine-type neutrality restrictions is even 
being seriously considered. The Broward County Court put it well in 
2000, when competition among broadband ISPs was not nearly as 
robust as today's: "It is ironic that a technology, which is permitting 
citizens greater ease of access to channels of communication than has 
existed at any time throughout history, is being subjected to the same 
arguments rejected by the Supreme Court in Tornillo.',49 
This strange push for new compelled access mandates under the 
guise of "net neutrality" presents a clear case in which greater 
appreciation for the First Amendment's free speech values will lead to 
sounder communications policy. We should not allow net neutrality to 
neuter the First Amendment in the digital age. 
48 In Turner Broadcasting Justice Kennedy stated: "The First Amendment's command that the 
government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking 
steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway 
of communication, the free flow of information and ideas." 512 U.S. at 657. In dissent, Justice 
O'Connor stated: "Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act as common 
carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being open to all with some sort of 
lottery system or timesharing arrangement. Setting aside any possible Takings Clause issues, it 
stands to reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common 
carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies ... " Id. at 684 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). The 
point here is simply to suggest that the Court might uphold involuntary imposition of common 
carrier obligations on broadband ISPs, the question is not entirely free from constitutional 
doubt. That is the import of Justice O'Connor's remark concerning possible Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause issues. This essay is not intended to address the Takings Clause issue. Here I 
would only point out that Justice Kennedy's statement quoted above, as a matter of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, is somewhat at odds with the Court's unanimous rejection of the 
relevance of the "monopoly" control argument in Tomi/lo. 
49 Comcast Cablevision o f  Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 694. 
